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ABSTRACT 
Fairness perceptions have been found to be a critical driving factor for solvers’ engagement in crowdsourcing. However, the 
literature still lacks on how to design crowdsourcing platform to enhance solvers’ fairness perceptions. By integrating 
organizational justice theory with the gamification literature, we conceptualize solvers’ perceptions of two typical gamification 
elements: the point-rewarding perception and the feedback-giving perception. We develop model to explain the effects of 
gamification perceptions on both distributive and interpersonal justice perceptions, which are conducive to solvers’ participation. 
Based on a survey of 295 solvers, we apply the partial least squares-structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) approach to test the 
research model. Results show that both point-rewarding perception and feedback-giving perception can enhance the distributive 
and interpersonal justice perceptions which, in turn, foster solvers’ crowdsourcing participation. Theoretical contributions and 
practical implications are discussed. 
 
Keywords: Gamification, crowdsourcing, organizational justice theory, distributive justice, interpersonal justice, point-rewarding 





Crowdsourcing platforms are popular online organizations that organize work by sourcing tasks to their members (Ye et al., 2017). 
According to the World Bank, the crowdsourcing initiatives generated $2 billion revenue globally in 2013 and the number is 
expected to reach between $15 billion and $25 billion by 2020. Crowdsourcing platforms allow firms to solve problems at a lower 
cost and retrieve market feedback about new products or services (Boons et al., 2015). However, the ratio of active participation in 
the crowdsourcing platforms remains extremely low. For instance, only about 6,000 members have visible active profiles in the 
InnoCentive, suggesting that 98.4% of the registered members are inactive in this platform. A significant reason for the low active 
participation in the crowdsourcing platform is the lack of sufficient fairness or justice perceived by the solvers, as evidenced in the 
crowdsourcing contests of Moleskine and Henkel (Faullant et al., 2017). The Moleskine Facebook page ended up with hundreds of 
negative comments from designers, fans and customers who are disappointed with the Moleskine incentive scheme, which awarded 
only the winner with a cash prize. In the case of Henkel, participants disagreed with the jury decision and the selected winners of 
the contest felt overruled. 
 
Anecdotal evidences suggested that in addition to monetary incentives, crowdsourcing solvers also care about fairness; and 
conflicts may arise due to perceived unfair treatment (Faullant et al., 2017). It has been reported that perceived unfairness in 
crowdsourcing contests may result from unfair prize allocations, nontransparent jury decisions, unfriendly climate and intolerable 
communication behavior (Franke et al., 2013; Gebauer et al., 2013). However, crowdsourcing literature reveals little about how to 
design the crowdsourcing platform to effectively alleviate the perceived unfairness in the crowdsourcing contests. 
 
Gamification elements, such as points, badges, and leaderboard, have been regarded as an effective non-monetary design 
mechanism in the context of organizational work (Mollick & Rothbard, 2014; Sarangi & Shah, 2015). It has been argued that 
gamification elements can act as non-monetary rewards that influence people’s perceptions of justice, which further alter their 
behaviors (Abdullah & Wan, 2013). Extrapolating to the context of gamified crowdsourcing, several gamification elements, such 
as points, badges, and leaderboard, effectively work as non-monetary incentives (Mekler et al., 2017), which might affect solvers’ 
justice perceptions and promote their participation. However, little research has explored the effects of gamification elements on 
crowdsourcing participation from the justice perspective. Without a nuanced understanding on how the gamification elements 
influence solvers’ justice perceptions and their behaviors, it may be challenging for crowdsourcing platforms to design effective 
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gamification elements that arouse solvers’ justice perceptions and foster their participation. Thus, this study aims to fill this gap by 
answering the research questions: How do gamification elements affect solvers’ justice perceptions and hence their participation in 
crowdsourcing? By integrating the organizational justice theory with the gamification literature, we develop a research model to 
explain the impacts of gamification elements perceptions on solvers’ crowdsourcing participation. We argue that two gamification 
elements perceptions, i.e., point-rewarding perception and feedback-giving perception will positively affect both distributive and 
interpersonal justice perceptions, which in turn affect solvers’ crowdsourcing participation. In general, this study will contribute to 
the crowdsourcing literature by empirically examining the impacts of gamification on solvers’ justice perceptions, which affect 
their participation. It will also extend the gamification literature by integrating organizational justice theory with the gamification 
literature and exploring the impacts of gamification elements on justice perceptions. 
 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. We first introduce the theoretical foundation of this paper, i.e., the gamification 
literature and the organizational justice theory. Based on the theoretical foundation, we develop our research model and hypotheses 
correspondingly. Next, we introduce the methodology as well as data analysis results. Finally, we discuss our findings and draw 
some implications for research and practice. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Organizational Justice Theory 
According to the organizational justice theory, justice denotes perceptions of fairness and assessments regarding the 
appropriateness of performance outcomes or processes (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). Recent theoretical development on 
organizational justice theory has centered on identifying and distinguishing different dimensions of justice such as distributive 
justice, procedural justice, interpersonal justice, and informational justice (Greenberg, 1993). Distributive justice focuses on 
evaluations of the fairness of economic and socio-emotional outcomes that an individual receives, while procedural justice refers to 
perception of fairness with regard to process and procedure used to make decisions concerning the outcome. The interactional 
aspect of procedural justice was extracted and conceptualized as interactional justice. Later, Greenberg (1993) further separated the 
interactional justice into two subcategories: interpersonal justice and informational justice. Interpersonal justice refers to the degree 
to which individuals are treated by others with politeness, dignity, friendliness, and respect, whereas informational justice reflects 
the adequacy of explanation behind the process and outcome (Greenberg, 2001). 
 
The organizational justice theory (OJT) primarily posits that users with high justice perceptions will develop trust and satisfaction 
in uncertain organizational circumstance, which enhance users’ reciprocity and loyalty towards the organizations. The OJT has 
been widely adopted by information systems researchers to analyze the justice perceptions of individuals when adopting the 
information systems. Some research has been done to investigate online crowdsourcing participation from the perspective of justice. 
These studies have mainly looked at the effects of perceived justice on solvers’ behaviors and outcomes, such as creativity (Franke 
& Klausberger, 2009; Zou et al., 2015), product interest and perceived product innovativeness (Faullant et al., 2017), and the 
efforts expended by the solvers (Franke et al., 2013). For example, Zuo et al. (2015) suggested that solvers’ perceptions of 
distributive, procedural, and interactional justice positively affect their creative performance, which are mediated by idea 
cooperation and idea generation. For another instance, Faullant et al. (2017) discovered that fairness perceptions of solvers can 
enhance their product interest, perceived innovativeness, and loyalty intentions. However, relatively little research has stepped 
further to explore the antecedents for the solvers’ justice perceptions. For instance, Fieseler et al. (2017) conducted a qualitative 
survey on 203 active workers in the Amazon Mechanical Turk and proposed some suggestions for increasing their fairness 
perceptions. They found that minimum remuneration and professionalization can enhance distributive fairness; increased 
transparency and dispute settlement, and workers’ representation both increase procedural justice; while humanization can promote 
interactional fairness. For another example, Franke et al. (2013) based on two experimental simulations to argue that terms and 
conditions of the crowdsourcing systems and the ex-ante level of identification with the organizing firm affect solvers’ perceptions 
of distributive fairness and procedural fairness which, in turn, influence their willingness to contribute and ex-post identification 
with the organizing firm. Apart from these few studies, several research has hinted that gamification design elements might impact 
the fairness perception as well (Callan et al., 2015; Mollick & Rothbard, 2014). In this study, we follow this line of research and 
explore the driving factors of solvers’ fairness perception from the gamification design perspective. We posit that gamification 
elements might play an effective role in strengthening the justice perceptions of solvers. 
 
Effects of Gamification Elements on Solver Participation 
Gamification, referred to the use of game elements in non-game contexts (Deterding et al., 2011), is first introduced to the 
educational settings as a mechanism to enhance student learning. The notion of gamification is not until recently adopted and 
developed by information systems scholars to the design of incentive mechanisms for information systems use (Hamari et al., 
2016). Gamification in information systems is defined as the adoption of gamified design elements (e.g., points, badge, leaderboard) 
in information systems in an attempt to, change or improve individual’s attitudes and usage behaviors towards the systems (Liu et 
al., 2017). 
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Gamification has also been applied to the context of online crowdsourcing, with the aim of enhancing solvers’ psychological and 
behavioral outcomes (Morschheuser et al., 2017). Past research has repeatedly noted that gamification elements foster solvers’ 
engagement and participation by affording their motivations. On one hand, a number of studies have found that gamification 
elements enhance solvers’ participation through their intrinsic motivations. For instance, Blohm & Leimeister (2013) found that 
offering points in crowdsourcing could enhance participants’ sense of flow and immersion, which further motivates them to 
produce high-quality results. In a similar vein, Goh et al. (2017) suggested that awarding points and badges could satisfy the 
motivational needs for autonomy and competence in mobile crowdsourcing games. Feng et al. (2018) based on motivational 
affordance perspective and discovered that points and feedbacks could motivate solvers to participate in microtask crowdsourcing 
by fulfilling their intrinsic needs for self-presentation, self-efficacy and playfulness. On the other hand, some studies have also 
suggested that gamification elements could as well intrigue solvers’ extrinsic motivations such as extrinsic need for reputation or 
recognition, thereby instigating their participation (Blohm & Leimeister, 2013).  
 
Apart from the well-received logic of “gamification-motivation-behavior”, prior research has also implied that some gamification 
elements (e.g., points, badges, leaderboard) might work as effective non-monetary incentives in addition to the monetary rewards 
in compensating for the solvers’ efforts and enhancing their fairness perceptions, which further motivate them to contribute (e.g., 
Kawajiri et al., 2014; Melenhorst et al., 2015). For instance, solvers with more points are trusted by crowdsourcers as competent 
service providers (Feng et al., 2018) and possess more chances of winning the bids. Therefore, awarding points is an effective way 
to reward the solvers’ efforts. Apart from that, badges and leaderboard might also play similar roles as points in acknowledging 
solvers’ efforts. Aside from this traditional PBL-triad (i.e., points, badges, leaderboard), feedbacks from the crowdsourcing firms, 
be it positive or negative, might also work as a useful mechanism to recognize the efforts of the solvers. According to the 
organizational justice theory, employees will commit to their organizations and conduct organizational citizenship behavior (e.g., 
working hard) when they perceive that they are treated fairly by their employers (Greenberg, 1993). Therefore, employers can 
motivate their labors to work harder by offering monetary or non-monetary rewards to recognize their efforts (Greenberg, 1993). 
Extrapolating to the context of crowdsourcing, the crowdsourcers could make use of the gamification elements (e.g., points and 
feedbacks) as effective non-monetary incentives to strengthen solvers’ justice perceptions, thereby sustaining their participation. 
However, in both the gamification and crowdsourcing literature, there is scant research trying to link the gamification elements to 
the justice perceptions and participation behaviors of the solvers. 
 
In the gamified crowdsourcing literature, points, leaderboards, badges/achievements, levels, progress, feedback, and virtual objects 
are the most frequently mentioned gamification elements (Morschheuser et al., 2017). In the crowdsourcing platform examined in 
the current study, points and feedbacks are two salient gamification elements, while leaderboards, badges, and virtual objects are 
not present in this platform. Besides, solver levels overlap with points while progress overlaps with feedbacks in this platform. 
Hence, in the current study, we specifically focus on points and feedbacks and empirically examine their effects on solvers’ justice 
perceptions and participation behaviors.  
 
Points are typically rewarded for the successful completion of specified activities within the gamified environment, and serve to 
numerically represent a player’s experience and capability (Morschheuser et al., 2017). In the online crowdsourcing platform of 
this study, points are rewarded when solvers participate and win the tasks. Points are not redeemable for money but could increase 
the solvers’ levels, which is a key criteria when crowdsourcing firms select the winners of the tasks. Hence, points represent a 
capability-related non-monetary incentive that acknowledges the efforts made by the solvers. Gamification elements only work 
when individuals pay attention to them. Because individuals perceive these elements differently, conceptualising their outcomes as 
perceptions is critical for the generalisation of our research findings. Hence, we follow the typical practices of past studies, which 
conceptualize technical elements as user perceptions. We define point-rewarding perception as the solvers’ perception of non-
monetary incentive mechanism through which the crowdsourcing platform can compensate them for their jobs. Apart from points, 
verbal feedbacks for solvers’ submissions are provided by the crowdsourcing firms regarding the quality of the submissions (Ye & 
Kankanhalli, 2017). One crowdsourcing task may receive thousands of submissions. When a solver’s submission receives 
feedbacks from the crowdsourcing firm, be it positive or negative, the solver will feel that his efforts has been recognized by the 
firm, thereby developing a sense of fairness. Hence, feedback giving denotes a task-related non-monetary incentive that can 
enhance the solvers’ justice perception. We thus define feedback-giving perception as the solvers’ perception of non-monetary 
incentive mechanism through which the crowdsourcing firms can acknowledge the work of them. Combining the above together, 
this study conceptualizes two gamification elements perceptions as point rewarding perception and feedback giving perception, and 
examines their roles as non-monetary incentives to motivate solvers’ participation through their justice perceptions.  
 
In terms of the justice perceptions, as illustrated above, procedural justice concerns with the fairness of the processes or procedures 
of decision-making, while informational justice deals with the adequacy of explanation behind the process and outcome. Therefore, 
both of these two justice perceptions center on the processes through which decisions/outcomes are made (Greenberg, 2001). In 
crowdsourcing platforms, points are allocated based on the solvers’ performance, while feedbacks are provided as a factual 
evaluation of the submission quality. These two gamification elements are more related to the outcomes (quality of the submission), 
rather than the processes leading to the outcomes (evaluation processes by the crowdsourcing firms). In addition, information 
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regarding the evaluation processes and selection criteria are normally provided a-priori in the task description section, rather than 
being offered in the feedbacks for each submission. Hence, in this study, when we focus on point rewarding and feedback giving as 
two gamification elements in the crowdsourcing platforms, we apply only two dimensions of justice, i.e., distributive justice and 
interpersonal justice to investigate the relationship between gamification elements and solvers’ participation. 
 
RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
Drawing on the gamification literature and the organizational justice theory described above, we develop a model to explain 
solvers’ participation in online crowdsourcing platforms as shown in Figure 1. Specifically, we expect that point rewarding 
perception and feedback giving perception positively affect solvers’ perceived distributive justice and interpersonal justice which, 
in turn, positively affects solvers’ crowdsourcing participation. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Research Model 
 
Point Rewarding Perception 
Point is one of the most frequently discussed gamification elements in crowdsourcing literature (Morschheuser et al., 2017). The 
crowdsourcing platform in the current study is equipped with noticeable point rewarding mechanism. As solvers take part in 
crowdsourcing contests and win the bids, they will receive a certain amount of points as non-monetary incentives apart from the 
predetermined monetary rewards (Morschheuser et al., 2017). A preponderance of managerial literature (Abdullah & Wan, 2013) 
indicates that providing non-monetary rewards is an important part of an overall employee compensation plan. In the online 
crowdsourcing platform, solvers typically devote a great amount of physical/cognitive and emotional efforts to winning the bids. 
Rewarding solvers with non-monetary incentives such as points indicates that the platform acknowledges the emotional efforts of 
the solvers. Hence, points provided by the crowdsourcing platform influences the emotional outcome (i.e., a major part of 
distributive justice) on the solver side. Meanwhile, solvers tend to consider the platform who provides the points to be responsive. 
This in turn leads to a perception that the crowdsourcing platform treats solvers with respect and politeness, i.e., with interpersonal 
justice. Therefore, we hypothesize, 
 
H1: Point rewarding perception leads to higher perceptions of (a) distributive justice and (b) interpersonal justice by solvers. 
 
Feedback Giving Perception 
Apart from points, another salient gamification element used in the crowdsourcing platform of the current study is feedback giving. 
After a crowdsourced task is completed and the winning bid(s) is selected, the crowdsourcing firm will be urged to offer clear and 
reasonable feedbacks/responses to each of the failed submissions, illustrating the reasons why these submissions are not selected. 
Past research (e.g., Blohm & Leimeister, 2013) has found that solvers have a normative expectation to receive an explanation of 
the outcome of their failed submissions. The act of providing feedbacks first fulfill solvers’ expectation. Second, if the selection 
criteria of the crowdsourcing firms is rather ambiguous or subjective, the provision of feedbacks can make the final decision at 
least partly “justifiable”. Feedbacks on the quality of the submissions could make the solvers view the final decision as the only 
feasible or option, which in turn make the final decision of the crowdsourcing firm emotionally acceptable (Morschheuser et al., 
2017). Giving feedbacks also demonstrates that a crowdsourcing firm concerns about the failure of individual solvers and puts 
sufficient effort to compensate the failed solvers. This will generate the perceptions that submissions are treated with respect by the 
crowdsourcing firm. Therefore, we expect that 
 
H2: Feedback giving perception leads to higher perceptions of (a) distributive justice and (b) interpersonal justice by solvers. 
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Distributive Justice and Interpersonal Justice 
Research on organizational justice has found clear evidence that perceived justice has an impact on individuals’ attitudes and 
behavior. Individuals who perceived themselves as treated unfairly will experience distress, and this distress will motivate efforts 
to restore fairness within the relationship; failing that, individuals will seek ways to terminate the relationship (Greenberg, 1993). 
Prior research has mostly agreed that both distributive and interpersonal justice will affect individual behavior In the context of 
crowdsourcing, there has been a few research showing that solvers’ crowdsourcing participation behavior is affected by distributive 
justice (Franke et al., 2013) and interpersonal justice (Zou et al., 2015). Thus, we expect 
 
H3: Perception of distributive justice is positively related to solvers’ crowdsourcing participation. 
H4: Perception of interpersonal justice is positively related to solvers’ crowdsourcing participation.  
 
We also include gender, age, education level, industry background in our model as control variables that might affect solvers’ 
participation in crowdsourcing tasks. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
We collect data from the target population (i.e., solver participants) of a large micro-task crowdsourcing platform through an online 
survey. All the constructs in our theoretical model are latent variables, which are best studied using the survey approach 
(Kankanhalli et al., 2015). It is worth noting that the online crowdsourcing platform in this study (i.e., Zhubajie.com) corresponds 
to the type of competition-based crowdsourcing platform, as most of the tasks in this platform are crowdsourced based on a 
competitive mode by the crowdsourcing firms. A crowdsourced task may receive thousands of submissions from individual solves, 
but only one or a handful of qualified submissions will be selected and financially rewarded by the crowdsourcing firms. When one 
submission is selected and financially rewarded, the solver who provided this submission will receive a certain amount of points. 
Besides, the crowdsourcing firms can autonomously provide feedbacks to every submission for their crowdsourced tasks. 
Generally speaking, tasks crowdsourced in this platform fall into the category of “simple task with high outcome variety”. Such 




We collected data through invitational private messages sent to registered solvers of the online crowdsourcing platform in this 
study. The invitational private message included an invitation letter and a link to the survey questionnaire hosted by an online 
survey platform (www.wenjuan.com) in China. Specifically, we obtained a list of registered solvers from the platform operator and 
randomly selected 1,000 solvers from the list. Then we sent out the invitational private messages to these solvers. 326 solvers 
responded by filling out the survey questionnaire, which results in a response rate of 32.6%. After deleting those incomplete 
responses and repeated responses, a total of 295 questionnaires were employed for data analysis. Table 1 demonstrates the 
demographic characteristics of the usable samples. 
 
Table 1: Demographics Information 
Measure Item Frequency  Percentage (%) 
Gender Male 169 57.3 
Female 126 42.7 
Age < 18 1 0.3 
18-24 96 32.5 
25-35 180 61.0 
36-50 17 5.8 
>50 1 0.3 
Education level High school and below 19 6.4 
College (Diploma) 90 30.5 







Industry  Education 
IT service 
Manufacturing 















Yang, Feng, Zheng, Feng, Yu, Niu & Yang 
 
The 18th International Conference on Electronic Business, Guilin, China, December 2-6, 2018 
330 
Measures 
Where available, the constructs in the conceptual model were operationalized using existing instruments adapted from past studies 
to enhance validity. Otherwise, new instruments were developed based on its definition, interviews with subjects and a review of 
previous gamification and crowdsourcing literature. Please find the items in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Operationalization of Constructs 




PNT1 This platform increases my points according to my 
behaviors (e.g., submission, winning the bids) 
 






Adapted from (Feng et al., 
2018) 
 
PNT2 This platform precisely evaluates my behaviors and 
increase my points  
PNT3 Points is a critical measurement for the competence 




FEB1 This platform allows the crowdsourcing firms to 
express thanks to my submissions 
FEB2 This platform allows the crowdsourcing firms to 
comment on my submissions 
FEB3 This platform allows the crowdsourcing firms to 
evaluate the quality of my submission (i.e., good, 
normal, or bad) 
Distributive Justice  (DIS) DIS1 What I obtain from this platform is fair compared 
to the efforts I have made 
Adapted from (Skarlicki & 
Folger, 1997; Zou et al., 
2015) 
DIS2 What I obtain from this platform is fair compared 
to the activeness of my response to the 
crowdsourcing firms’ requests 
DIS3 What I obtain from the platform is fair compared to 
the speed of response to the crowdsourcing firms’ 
requests 
DIS4 What I obtain from the platform is fair compared to 
the time and efforts I devote to completing the tasks 
Interpersonal Justice  (INT) INT1 I am treated politely in this platform  Adapted from (Colquitt, 
2001) INT2 I am treated kindly in this platform 
INT3 I am treated with respect in this platform 
INT4 My membership rights are attended and valued in 
this platform  
Solver Participation (PAR) PAR1 I plan to actively participate in the tasks of this 
platform 
Adapted from (Wu & 
Sukoco, 2010) 
PAR2 I plan to actively participate in the tasks of this 
platform in the future 
PAR3 I will try my best to engage in tasks in this 
platform, rather than leaving it 
PAR4 I will keep a relatively high level of participation in 
this platform in the future 
Notes: All items are based on 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) 
 
To enhance the validity of the newly developed instruments (i.e., instruments for point rewarding and feedback giving), we 
conducted exploratory interviews with eight crowdsourcing solvers to identify what gamification features they recognized and 
perceived when using this platform. We also conducted a pilot test with 40 individuals to validate the new instruments. Following 
the procedures introduced by past research, items for all constructs are tested with a two-stage Q-sorting process to enhance their 
content validity, convergent validity as well as discriminant validity. All instruments were measured using five-point Likert-scales 
anchored from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” (See Table 2 for the instruments). Items from English were translated into 
Chinese and given to six information systems professors who were proficient in both languages for reverse translation. We then 
carefully considered all controversial translations. 
 
RESULTS 
Partial least squares (PLS) was adopted to analyze the survey data. PLS-SEM instead of co-variance based SEM is suitable for 
analyzing the model with formative constructs (Wetzels et al., 2009). Following Wetzels et al. (2009), bootstrapping was 
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performed to test the statistical significance of path coefficients. In the model tested, all constructs were modeled as reflective. 
SmartPLS 2.0 was used for data analysis. 
 
The Measurement Model 
Convergent validity is assessed by (1) reliability of items, (2) composite reliability of constructs (>0.7), (3) average variance 
extracted (AVE) (>0.5) , and (4) factor analysis results. Examining each item’s loading on its corresponding construct assesses 
reliability of items (Standardized Factor Loading > 0.7). In this study, the loading of each item meets this criterion (Table 3). 
Regarding internal consistency (reliability), composite reliability scores and Cronbach’s alpha scores for every construct (as shown 
in Table 4) are well above 0.70, which is the suggested benchmark for acceptable reliability. AVE measures the amount of variance 
that a construct captures from its indicators relative to the amount due to measurement error. It is recommended to exceed 0.50. 
Table 4 shows that the AVE score for every construct, ranging from 0.73 to 0.77, satisfies this requirement. In addition, to show 
good convergent validity in factor analysis results, all of the items should load highly on their own latent variables. Factor analysis 
results in this study (see Table 3) are satisfactory according to these criteria. 
 
Table 3: Exploratory Factor Analysis Results 
 1 2 3 4 5 
PAR1 0.85 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.12 
PAR2 0.83 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.16 
PAR3 0.81 0.10 0.22 0.17 0.06 
PAR4 0.83 0.15 0.06 0.11 0.24 
DIS1 0.15 0.82 0.23 0.12 0.12 
DIS2 0.15 0.80 0.24 0.08 0.18 
DIS3 0.12 0.83 0.22 0.15 0.11 
DIS4 0.15 0.77 0.26 0.15 0.09 
INT1 0.20 0.22 0.73 0.19 0.24 
INT2 0.17 0.24 0.76 0.19 0.16 
INT3 0.13 0.26 0.82 0.09 0.12 
INT4 0.13 0.31 0.75 0.13 0.20 
PNT1 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.24 0.77 
PNT2 0.15 0.10 0.23 0.23 0.81 
PNT3 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.80 
FEB1 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.80 0.24 
FEB2 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.84 0.22 
FEB3 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.79 0.14 
Eigenvalue 7.72 2.04 1.68 1.17 1.04 
% of variance 42.88 11.31 9.35 6.50 5.78 
Cumulative% 42.88 54.19 63.54 70.03 75.80 
 
Table 4: Means, Standard Deviations, Scale Reliabilities, and Inter-Correlations 
Variable Mean SD CA CR AVE PAR DIS INT PNT FEB 
PAR 4.03 0.73 0.90 0.93 0.76 0.87     
DIS 3.69 0.79 0.89 0.92 0.75 0.39 0.87    
INT 3.90 0.64 0.88 0.92 0.73 0.43 0.61 0.85   
PNT 3.94 0.68 0.85 0.91 0.77 0.44 0.42 0.52 0.88  
FEB 4.06 0.76 0.84 0.90 0.76 0.39 0.39 0.45 0.54 0.87 
Notes: Diagonal elements are the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) 
SD, standard deviation; CA, Cronbach’s alpha; CR, composite reliability 
 
Discriminant validity is assessed by examining the indicator-construct loadings and inter-construct correlations. As shown in Table 
3, all indicators load more strongly on their corresponding constructs than on other constructs in the model. Table 4 shows the 
square roots of the average variance extracted (AVE) are larger than the inter-construct correlations. Overall, the constructs 
demonstrate strong discriminant validity.  
 
Finally, we assessed the extent of common method variance (CMV) using the marker-variable technique. The marker variable 
utilized was fantasizing, which is theoretically unrelated and we examined correlations between the marker variable and other 
constructs. Fantasizing had been used as marker variable in several prior studies (e.g., Ye & Kankanhalli, 2017; Feng et al., 2018) 
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and showed good validity in detecting CMV. The smallest correlation with fantasizing was -0.03 (p>0.05), indicating that CMV 
was not substantial in our study. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis testing results are shown in Figure 2 and Table 5. Demographic variables (i.e., gender, age, education level and 
industry) were included in the analysis as controls for solver participation. None of the control variables except for gender (β=0.12, 
p<0.01) were significant, indicating that female are more willing to participate in crowdsourcing than male. 
 
Consistent with our prediction, point rewarding exhibits a positive influence on distributive justice (β=0.29, p<0.001), hence 
supporting H1(a). Point rewarding also shows positive influence on interpersonal justice (β=0.39, p<0.001), supporting H1(b). 
Consistent with our prediction, feedback giving is positively related to distributive justice (β=0.24, p<0.001), supporting H2(a). 
The relationship between feedback giving and interpersonal justice is also significant (β=0.24, p<0.001),supporting H2(b). 
Moreover, as anticipated, both distributive justice (β=0.21, p<0.001) and interpersonal justice (β=0.30, p<0.001) exhibit positive 
relationship with solvers’ participation, supporting both H3 and H4. Table 5 summarizes the results of the hypothesis tests. 
 
Figure 2: Hypothesis Testing Result 
 
Table 5: Tests of Research Hypotheses 
Proposed paths Path estimates p-levels S.E. Hypothesis tests 
H1(a) PNT  DIS 0.29 <0.001 0.07 Supported 
H1(b) PNT    INT 0.39 <0.001 0.06 Supported 
H2(a) FEB  DIS 0.24 <0.001 0.07 Supported 
H2(b) FEB  INT 0.24 <0.001 0.06 Supported 
H3 DIS  PAR 0.21 <0.001 0.06 Supported 
H4 INT  PAR 0.30 <0.001 0.07 Supported 
 
DISCUSSION 
Nowadays, individuals and organizations increasingly count on online crowdsourcing platforms for effective solutions and creative 
ideas (Ye & Kankanhalli, 2017). Motivating solvers to perform is the key to the sustainability of these online crowdsourcing 
platforms (Ye & Kankanhalli, 2017). How to encourage solvers to participate in solving crowdsourced tasks is always an important 
topic for researchers and practitioners. Considering this, we seek to enrich the understanding of solvers’ participation in the 
crowdsourcing platforms. Empirical results support our hypotheses that the perceptions of two typical gamification elements (i.e., 
point rewarding and feedback giving) positively affect solvers’ distributive and interpersonal justice perceptions. These two 
distinct types of justice perception, in turn, positively influence solvers’ participation. Taken together, results of this study suggest 
that gamification elements indirectly influence solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing platforms through both the distributive and 
interpersonal justice perceptions. 
 
Theoretical Contributions 
This study makes several important theoretical contributions. First, we enrich the literature on gamified crowdsourcing (Goh et al., 
2017) by theoretically conceptualizing gamification elements into point rewarding perception and feedback giving perception, and 
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theorizing and testing their impacts on solvers’ justice perceptions and participation. This paves a way for future study on the 
impacts of gamification artifacts. 
 
Second, past empirical literature on gamification has been limited to studying the impacts of gamification elements on solvers’ 
motivations (Mekler et al., 2017). Although prior research has inferred that some gamification artifacts may work as non-monetary 
incentives that supplement the monetary rewards in compensating solvers’ efforts and enhancing their fairness perceptions (Mekler 
et al., 2017), little research has empirically examined the effects of gamification artifacts on solvers’ justice perceptions. This study 
extends previous gamification literature by theorizing and empirically validating the impacts of gamification element perceptions 
on solvers’ justice perceptions in the crowdsourcing platforms. Results suggest that in crowdsourcing platforms, point rewarding 
and feedback giving artifacts can affect both distributive and interpersonal justice perceptions of the solvers. 
 
Third, prior crowdsourcing research has been mainly limited to studying the impacts of different justice perceptions on solvers’ 
participation (Zou et al., 2015; Faullant et al., 2017). This study enriches previous crowdsourcing studies (Franke et al., 2013) by 
stepping further to explore and examine platform designs as antecedents for justice perceptions. Specifically, we conceptualize 
point rewarding and feedback giving as two typical gamification elements perceptions and bridge them with the distributive and 
interpersonal justice perceptions of the solvers. This extends our knowledge on how the crowdsourcing platforms can be designed 
to compensate the solvers and motivate them to participate.  
 
Fourth, this study contributes to the literature on organizational justice theory. We link organizational justice theory with 
gamification literature to theorize on the impacts of gamification artifacts. As a result, we identify two gamification artifacts as the 




From a pragmatic view, we provide insights to firms and crowdsourcing platform operators on how to encourage solvers to 
participate in crowdsourcing. Specifically, this study contributes to practice in three ways. First, it provides suggestions for 
encouraging solvers to participate in crowdsourcing through designing an effective point rewarding mechanism. On one hand, 
results suggest that a well-designed points system could promote solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing by enhancing their 
distributive justice perception, that is, the evaluation of fairness of economic and socio-emotional outcomes they receive. 
Crowdsourcing platforms should promote to solvers the notion that earning more points could be regarded by crowdsourcing firms 
as competent solvers and thus bringing more chances to win the bids. When solvers consider the points as valuable non-monetary 
incentives, they will believe that their emotional efforts are properly compensated and thus are more willing to sustain their 
participation. On the other hand, results of this study also indicate that rewarding solvers with points immediately after the tasks 
are completed could make them feel they are politely treated, thereby being more proactive in task participation. 
 
Second, an effective feedback mechanism is also important. Crowdsourcing platforms could attempt to reinforce solvers’ 
distributive and interpersonal justice perceptions by soliciting the crowdsourcing firms to offer prompt and constructive feedbacks 
for the submissions. Specifically, crowdsourcing platforms should encourage the firms to reply to as many as the submissions 
immediately after the task is completed. To achieve that, crowdsourcing platforms should design a function to remind the firms to 
select bids and provide feedbacks when the bidding period is ended. Additionally, crowdsourcing firms should be encouraged to be 
constructive when they provide feedbacks. Prompt and constructive feedbacks can reinforce solvers’ sense of distributive and 
interpersonal justice which, in turn, enhance their crowdsourcing participation. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
We acknowledge some limitations in this study. First, different from prior research that typically adopted an experimental method 
to study the effects of gamification artifacts, we examine the effects of gamification artifacts through a cross-sectional survey, 
which has its own merits. Although the experimental method might be better in inferring the causal relationships among studied 
variables, the external validity and generalizability of the findings might be compromised. On contrary, survey could enhance the 
external validity and generalizability to a certain extent. Apart from that, in this study we operationalized the two gamification 
elements as solvers’ perceptions, which are latent variables and are best studied with survey method (Kankanhalli et al., 2015). 
 
Second, as different types of crowdsourcing tasks require different amounts of efforts by the solvers, for tasks that are more 
complicated or large-sized, solvers have to devote a greater amount of time and efforts to complete them (Ye & Kankanhalli, 2017). 
In this situation, efforts can never be accurately measured and compensated by monetary rewards, solvers may value more on non-
monetary incentives and place more emphasis on emotional and interpersonal fairness of the deals. Hence, our findings might be 
best generalized to large-sized or complicated tasks. We acknowledge that for small-sized or less complicated tasks, solvers might 
value less on the non-monetary incentives and care more about the immediate monetary rewards. Future research replicating our 
study should at least take the size and complexity of the crowdsourcing tasks into consideration. 
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Third, although we carefully select pertinent variables into our model based on theoretical foundations, we cannot exclude a 
possibility of omitting relevant variables. For example, our model focuses on two main dimensions of justice (distributive and 
interpersonal justice). Organizational justice literature suggests that there are other two dimensions of justice (i.e., procedural and 
informational justice). We refrained from including these two dimensions in our model because we suspected that points and 
feedbacks are not related to processes leading to the selection outcomes, about which these two dimensions of justice concern. 
However, we acknowledge that some crowdsourcing firms might still incorporate explanations of their selection processes in their 
feedbacks, which could influence the procedural and information justice perceptions as well. Future research should also account 
for this possible link. 
 
This study opens up a number of exciting avenues for further research. This study shows the influences of two typical gamification 
artifacts on solvers’ justice perceptions and participation. Yet, there is a range of gamification artifacts of which the effecting paths 
remain unknown. We encourage researchers to identify other gamification artifacts (e.g., badges, leaderboard) that may be 
important and to examine how such artifacts affect solvers’ justice perceptions and participation in online crowdsourcing platforms. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite various measures taken, solvers’ participation continues to be inadequate in online crowdsourcing platforms. Given the 
importance of solvers’ participation, practitioners have expressed substantial concerns on encouraging such behaviors. To this end, 
we provide a theory-driven approach to evaluate the importance of gamification artifacts in helping practitioners to enhance the 
sustainability of crowdsourcing platforms via distributive and interpersonal justice perceptions. Our findings clearly indicate that 
the integration of gamification literature and organizational justice theory is essential for a better understanding of solvers’ 
participation in the gamified crowdsourcing platforms. We believe that the model proposed in this study can serve as a solid 
foundation for future work in this important area. 
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